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Abstract
Environmental regulations implemented by administrative agencies have often been met with
fierce political resistance from regulated parties.  In some instances, regulated parties have turned
to legislative and judicial bodies for relief from environmental regulation.  As these political and
legal battles have escalated, several forms of compromises have evolved.  The U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, in its administration of the Endangered Species Act, has often utilized the tool of
“Habitat Conservation Planning” as a means by which some regulatory relief is granted in
exchange for an agreement by the regulated party to undertake mitigation measures to aid
endangered or threatened species.  As a further inducement for regulated parties to enter into the
Habitat Conservation Planning process, the Service has also adopted a “No Surprises” policy of
guaranteeing regulated parties that if certain additional mitigation measures are taken, then if in
the future any further mitigation measures are deemed necessary to protect endangered or
threatened species, they will only be undertaken at the expense of the Service.  This paper
develops simple models of the conditions under which such compromise agreements are offered
by a regulator, and the conditions under which the regulated party either accepts such an offer or
pursues a strategy of appealing to legislative or judicial bodies for relief from regulation.Introduction
Through litigation and aggressive legislative lobbying, property rights advocates and
landowners affected by environmental and land-use planning regulations have mounted some
successful challenges to the administrative authority of local, state and federal regulators.  Some
landowners have sued regulators to force them to rescind or modify a regulation, and in some
cases, force them to pay compensation for a regulatory "taking" of private property under the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  While landowners' successes have been far from
complete, several of their noteworthy victories have significantly influenced regulatory behavior.
Also, in state and federal legislatures, property rights advocates have enjoyed some success in
urging for “takings” legislation, which typically provide that regulations resulting in a diminution
in private property value in excess of some threshold amount shall trigger a requirement that the
regulating agency compensate the property owner.  Again, while some bills have passed and some
have failed, the mere fact that these bills made their way onto the legislative agenda has resulted in
some discernible leniency on the part of regulators.
Engaging in legislative and judicial conflicts, however, is costly.  Some regulatory agencies
have forged regulatory compromises with regulated parties.  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(the “Service”), the agency with primary responsibility for administration of the Endangered
Species Act (the “ESA”), has been the target of litigation filed by property rights advocates and
landowners affected by ESA regulations, and the subject of some hostility within Congress.  As
pressure for ESA reform has intensified, the Service has responded by utilizing Habitat
Conservation Plans (“HCPs”) to develop regulatory compromises.  HCPs are voluntary
agreements between the Service and landowners affected by the ESA, whereby a landowner
agrees to undertake specific mitigation measures on her property in exchange for an “Incidental2
Take Permit,” which authorizes her to pursue activities harmful to listed endangered or threatened
species that would otherwise be prohibited by the ESA.  While the HCP process has been in place
since 1982, the Service has only recently begun to use HCPs extensively.
Another compromise-oriented policy that the Service has adopted is the “No Surprises”
policy, which has been conveniently folded into the HCP process.  In the interests of long-term
habitat conservation planning, most HCPs are now more comprehensive but contain "No
Surprises" assurances to the landowner she will not be asked to undertake any further mitigation
measures deemed necessary in the future to preserve listed species.  No Surprises assurances are
most important in cases where the landowner agrees to undertake mitigation measures
significantly beyond those required for the HCP, typically for species that have yet to become
listed as endangered or threatened, or for species that do not yet occupy the area covered by the
HCP.  If, in the future, such species become listed or move into the area covered by the HCP, the
No Surprises assurances protects the landowner from any obligation to undertake more mitigation
measures.  Landowners thus trade profits for certainty, a tradeoff that they appear to have gladly
accepted.  Also, both sides benefit from the advance settlement of a conflict that might otherwise
require substantial resources to resolve in a judicial or legislative setting.
Following Segerson and Miceli, this paper models the HCP process and the No Surprises
process as dynamic games of symmetric information and sequential rationality.  Each game has
two risk-neutral players, Regulator, (“R”) and Landowner (“L”).  L maximizes expected private
profits and R maximizes the expected wealth of society, but does not take into account L's
welfare.  Each game has an extra-executive branch of government that may grant regulatory relief
to L, should L seek it.  In addition, in the No Surprises model there is a nonzero probability that
additional mitigation measures will become necessary in the future to protect listed species.3
The HCP Model
In the HCP model (fig. 1), the first move is made by the regulator R: she has a choice of:
(i) imposing a regulation upon the landowner L, (ii) not imposing the regulation, or  (iii) offering
L an HCP compromise.  If R opts to not impose the regulation at all, L will obtain her full profits
P, and R will suffer E, the full external damage costs of L’s development.  If R offers L an HCP





= Judiciary  or
   Legislature moves
{L, R} = payoffs for L, R
h = percent of development L
      allowed under compromise
s = probability L wins lawsuit
      or legislative reform
E = external social cost
       of L’s development
P = L’s profits from
       development
BL = cost of preparing HCP
CL = L’s cost of lawsuit/lobbying
CR = R’s cost of lawsuit/lobbying 













{P - CL, 
  -E - CR}
{-CL, -CR}
 accept





{hP-BL, -hE + W(h) }
G
compromise and L accepts (in a symmetric information game there is no reason for R to offer a
compromise that L will not accept -- hence there is no branch of the game tree representing L's
refusal of a compromise), then L only develops the fraction h of her land, and obtains partial
profits hP, while R suffers only partial damages, hE, and garners any benefits of cooperation that
may accrue from the compromise, W(h), such as information-sharing benefits.  L is assumed to4
bear the costs of preparing and implementing an HCP, BL.  If R opts to regulate, then L may: (i)
accept the regulation and refrain from development, or (ii) seek regulatory relief from outside the
agency, by either suing R or lobbying for legislative relief.  For expositional purposes, however, I
collapse the litigation and legislative strategies into a composite one, which I refer to for the sake
of convenience as simply "litigation" or "L sues R," or some equivalent phrase.
If R opts to regulate and L accepts the regulation, payoffs are zero for both R and L -- L
obtains no profits, and R suffers no external damage costs.  If L sues R, an extra-executive branch
will rule in favor of L with probability s.  L's expected payoff if she sues will therefore be s(P-
CL)+(1-s)(-CL) = sP-CL, while R's expected payoff will be s(-E-CR)+(1-s)(-CR) = -sE-CR.
Games of symmetric information are solved by backward induction (Rasmusen, p. 94).  If
we solve the HCP model in this manner, we can reduce the HCP game into three cases:
sP P-CL < 0.  If faced with regulation, L will not sue, because the payoffs of simply
accepting the regulation are greater.  R knows this, and will regulate without fear of being sued.
sP P-CL > 0 and –E > –sE-CR.  R knows that L will sue, and L knows that R would rather
suffer the full external damages rather than face litigation.  R will not regulate in this case, so L
will fully pursue her development plans without fear of regulation.
sP P-CL > 0 and –E < -sE-CR.   Both L and R are willing to litigate.  But if we assume that
CL+CR > BL (i.e., the combined costs of litigation are greater than the costs of preparing an HCP),
then there will always exist an h such that both L and R are better off compromising rather than
allowing the situation to degenerate into litigation, even if we assume that W(h)=0.  Thus, in this
case, there will always emerge a compromise in the form of an HCP.
The HCP model poses interesting empirical questions, such as the actual values of h that
are observed in HCPs.  Because of our assumption of sequential rationality, the HCP model5
predicts that if R wanted to compromise, she would offer L as small an h as possible that still
induces her to accept a compromise, or that hP ³ sP-(CL-BL).  The smallest h possible is thus:
h=s-(CL-BL)/P (1)
However, if the model were changed so that L moved first, then we would expect L to offer to
carry out an HCP with the maximum h acceptable to R, or such that -hE ³ -sE-CR, or
h=s+CR/E (2)
Whether h is closer to the minimum or maximum possible values is an empirical question, and tells
us whether L or R is more adept at negotiating and capturing the gains from trade.  This can be
accomplished by determining whether h varies with E or P, and thus whether equation (1) or (2)
is the correct model.  If R is capturing the gains from trade, then dh/dP=(CL-BL)/P
 2 > 0 and
dh/dE=0.  If L is capturing the gains from trade, then dh/dP=0 and dh/dE=-CR/E
2 < 0.  To
understand these results, it is necessary to imagine an Edgeworth box in which L and R have
scope for trade.  If R is appropriating the gains from trade, then the values of h of the various
HCPs will lie along the landowner's indifference curve.  As P increases, L's indifference curve will
shift outward, and the value of h will increase along with P.  On the other hand, if L is
appropriating the gains from trade, then the values of h for the various HCPs will lie along R's
indifference curve, and as R's indifference curve shifts inwards with higher values of E, h will shift
inwards along with it.
Equations (1) and (2) also yield the comparative static result dh/ds=1, indicating that as
the probability of a successful lawsuit by L increases, so does the fraction of property that R will
allow L to develop.  This is a fundamental result of this model, as it formalizes the hypothesis that
landowners are converting their political and judicial leverage into regulatory relief.6
The No Surprises Model
The No Surprises model (fig. 2) presupposes the existence of an HCP.  Except for P and
E, the same notation is used in both models when the variables are likely to take on similar values.
For example, litigation costs are probably the same whether the lawsuit occurs at the HCP stage
or at the No Surprises stage, so they are denoted CR for the regulator and CL for the
Figure 2.  No Surprises model
Y(q) = benefits of cooperating
DL = cost of preparing HCP 
CR = R’s cost of lawsuit/lobbying
CL = L’s cost of lawsuit/lobbying
{L, R} = payoffs for L, R 
E = external social cost
       of L’s development
P = L’s profits from
       development
R = Regulator moves
L = Landowner moves
= Judiciary or
   Legislature moves































{qP-DL, -qE  + Y(q)}






1-p: no add’l 
mitigation  needed
q = fraction of development L
      allowed under compromise
p = probability additional
      mitigation measures necessary
r = probability L wins lawsuit or
      legislative reform
landowner in both models.  However, the baseline values for P and E are assumed to be that
which is achieved after an HCP, i.e., L's and R's payoffs of compromise in the HCP game, hP-BL
and -hE respectively, are transformed to P and 0, respectively, in the No Surprises game.
At the beginning of the No Surprises game, both R and L know that at some future time7
Nature will determine whether additional mitigation measures (beyond those already agreed to
and carried out under the HCP) will be necessary to save listed species; this will occur with
probability p.  The No Surprises model begins with a decision by R as to whether or not to offer a
No Surprises compromise.  As in the HCP model, R will not offer L a compromise unless R
knows L will accept.  If the parties compromise, L will develop the fraction q of her property, and
obtain partial profits of qP.  R's payoffs of compromise are probabilistic -- if additional mitigation
measures (beyond those specified by the HCP) become necessary in the future, then R's payoff
will be -qE; if they do not become necessary, R suffers no loss at all and her payoff is zero.  R's
expected payoff of compromise is thus p(-qE)+(1-p)0 = -pqE.  R also obtains the benefits of
compromising, Y(q).
This game is also solved by backward induction.  L's expected payoff if she sues R is r(P-
CL)+(1-r)(-CL) = rP-CL, and R's expected payoff is r(-E-CR)+(1-r)(-CR) = -rE-CR.  As in the
HCP model, folding back the game tree again gives rise to three cases:
rP P-CL < 0.  L will not sue.  Knowing this, R will not compromise.  If additional mitigation
measures become necessary in the future R will require L to undertake them.
rP P-CL > 0 and  -E > -rE-CR. R will sue, and L will wish to avoid litigation.  Since both
sides know this, L will refuse any compromise and fully develop her property, knowing that if
additional mitigation measures become necessary R will not attempt to impose them upon L.
rP P-CL > 0 and  -E < -rE-CR.  L will sue, and R will regulate, taking her chances with L's
lawsuit.  However, R will offer a No Surprises compromise if there exists some q such that the
expected payoffs of compromise are greater than the expected payoffs of litigation for both R and
L.  This is true if:
qP-DL > (1-p)P + p(rP-CL)    (for L)   and8
-pqE + Y(q) > p(-rE-CR)    (for R)
If we make the simplifying assuming that Y(q)=0 (a reasonable one, since the benefits of
compromising are speculative), combining these conditions by solving q out yields:
(1-r)(1-p) < CR/E + (pCL-DL)/P (3)
Condition (3) is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a compromise. The relationship
between the three cases and condition (3) is expressed by a graph in r-p space (fig. 3).
If the probability r of L winning a lawsuit against R are high enough or low enough, then the
probability of future mitigation measures becoming necessary are irrelevant, since there is no
uncertainty as to how the parties will react – either L or R will bow to the other's will, giving rise
to the "develop" and "regulate" regions in figure 3.  If r assumes some intermediate value,
however, such that both L and R would be willing to litigate, then there is a chance that the
parties will compromise; whether they do or not depends on the values of both r and p.
For p > 1-(CL-DL)/P-CR/E (this condition is obtained by setting r=CL/P and solving for
p), there will always emerge a compromise.  To understand this result it is necessary to recall that
in the HCP model, if the combined costs of litigating are greater than the costs of preparing an
HCP, compromising is always better than litigating.  If the same assumption is made in the No
Surprises model (CL+CR>BL), both parties know that in this intermediate case of r (where both
parties are willing to litigate), if additional mitigation measures are deemed necessary in the
future, L and R together will incur the cost CL+CR-DL relative to a No Surprises compromise.  If
the probability p of this happening is high enough, L and R will compromise to avoid this
contingency.  Generally, the higher the value of p, the greater the likelihood of a compromise.
For p < DL/[CR(P/E)+CL] (this condition is obtained by setting r=1-CR/E and solving for

















Figure 3.  Regulatory
Outcomes in r-p Space.
measures becoming necessary in the future is so small it is not worthwhile for L to insure herself
by agreeing to any additional mitigation measures now.
For the intermediate case DL/[CR(P/E)+CL] < p < 1-(CL-DL)/P-CR/E, a compromise
becomes more likely the greater the value of r.  This is because as r increases, L's expected
payoffs of litigation increases by pP, while R's expected payoffs of litigation decreases by pE, for
a net social decrease of p(E-P), assuming E>P.  The less attractive litigation becomes, the more
attractive a No Surprises compromise becomes.
The No Surprises model also presents interesting empirical questions.  As in the HCP
model, we may test to see if R or L is appropriating the gains from compromise, as well as test
the most basic hypothesis of this paper, that the fraction of development increases with the10
probability of a successful lawsuit by L.  In addition, we may derive comparative statics with
respect to the probability of future mitigation measures becoming necessary.
Recall that for intermediate values of r (both R and L are willing to litigate) if a
compromise is struck it means that L's expected payoffs from a compromise are greater than they
are for taking chances with additional mitigation measures and ensuing litigation.  As noted in the
derivation of condition (3), this means that qP-DL ³ (1-p)P + p(rP-CL).  If we assume that R
offers L the minimum q possible that still induces L to accept a compromise, then the q that will
be offered by R and agreed to by L is (assuming that Y(q)=0):
q = 1 - p + pr - CL/P + DL/P (4)
If, on the other hand, we assume that L is the first mover and offers R the maximum q possible
that will still induce R to accept a compromise, then we have -pqE ³ -prE - pCR, or
q = r + CR/E (5)
If we take the derivative of (4) and (5) with respect to P, E and r, we obtain the same
comparative statics results as we obtained from (1) and (2) from the HCP model.  In addition, (4)
yields a relationship between q and p.  Comparative statics results are summarized in table 1.
Table 1.  Comparative Statics Results.
HCP Model No Surprises Model
R captures all GFT:
h = s-(CL-BL)/P
L captures all GFT:
h = s+CR/E
R captures all GFT:
q = 1-p+pr-(CL-DL)/P
L captures all GFT:
q = r+CR/E
dh/dP = (CL-BL)/P
2 dh/dP = 0 dq/dP = (CL-DL)/P
2 dq/dP = 0
dh/dE = 0 dh/dE = -CR/E
2 dq/dE = 0 dq/dE = -CR/E
2
dh/ds = 1 dh/ds = 1 dq/dr = p dq/dr = p
dq/dp = -1+r dq/dp = 0
As table 1 indicates, both the HCP model and the No Surprises model yield dual11
hypotheses that allow us to ascertain if R or L is capturing the gains from trade in a compromise
by testing to see if the fraction of development allowed varies with P or E.  These comparative
statics results also allow us to check for consistency of the models, in that it should always be true
that dh/dP ³ 0  and dh/dE £ 0.  These results make sense because they reflect the increasing
marginal values that the parties place on gaining more favorable terms of compromise.  The higher
the overall profits of the development project, the greater is the value of an extra unit of land to L.
Similarly, the higher the external social damages of development, the greater is the value to R of
preservation of an extra unit of land.  Both models also provide a means for testing the most
fundamental tenet of this paper, that the terms of compromise are affected by the probability of L
successfully obtaining extra-executive redress through suing or through seeking legislative reform.
This is also intuitive, in that the more leverage enjoyed by L, the more favorable a deal that L
should receive in a compromise.
Also, in the No Surprises model, if we assume that R appropriates all of the gains from
trade in a compromise, we also obtain the comparative static result dq/dp < 0, indicating that as
the probability of future mitigation increases, the fraction allowed for development decreases.
However, if we assume that L appropriates all of the gains from trade, we obtain the result
dq/dp=0.  This lack of symmetry can be explained by the manner in which the probability p enters
linearly into R's payoff functions whether R compromises or not, whereas L's payoff of
compromise does not depend upon p at all.  In comparing payoffs, p will cancel out of both
payoffs for R, but not for L.  Were R were risk-averse, we would then expect to see more
propensity by R to compromises, and perhaps more generous terms of compromise as p increases,
or dq/dp > 0.  At any rate, the No Surprises model allows us to test to see if R or L is forcing the
other to bear the burden of uncertainty by demanding a higher or lower q.12
Conclusion
The game-theoretic models presented in this paper may explain much regulator and
landowner behavior with regards to ESA regulation, and provide some heuristic value to
analyzing the regulatory bargaining process.  Importantly, the model structures lend themselves to
testable hypotheses.  The most fundamental hypothesis is that as the probability of the landowner
successfully obtaining regulatory relief increases, the fraction of development allowed by the
regulator will increase as well.  Also, both models generate dual hypotheses that either the
landowner or the regulator is capturing the gains from trade in a compromise.  If the fraction of
development allowed varies with the external social damages, then we know that the landowner is
capturing all of the gains from trade, forcing the regulator to walk along her indifference curve; if
the fraction varies with the private profits of development, then the roles are reversed.
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